Music Business – Hindsight 20/20
July 18, 2009 at 7:23 am | In Marketing, Media Business, Music Business | 1 CommentTags: 8-track, albums, Amazon, Cassette, CDs, Chris Anderson, Clore Chronicles, consumers, cross-marketing, digital, Direct to Consumer, distribution, download, Elio Leoni-Sceti, Email Marketing, EMI, facebook, fair use, Future, History, iTunes, labels, Marketing, Merch Intellectual Property, Music, Music Business, myspace, p2p, Pricing, Promotion, Relational Marketing, Seth Godin, Tracks, twitter, Vinyl
EMI Music CEO Elio Leoni-Sceti has been recently quoted saying:
Looking at the music industry, which has become something of a bellwether for other media businesses, we have a situation where seventy percent of music consumption is digital and yet only about twenty percent of music company revenues are derived from digital. Music is in demand and the demand is growing all the time, but we’ve clearly lost touch with our consumers.
Not to ‘Monday Morning Quarterback’ too much, but I would argue that in order to lose touch with your consumers, you actually have to be in touch to begin with and that has never been the case. Consumers are ’song’ driven and have been since the beginning of radio, but it was always the format that restricted consumption. From vinyl, to 8-track, to cassette, to CD there were always natural barriers in place to restrict unauthorized distribution. While those restrictions were in place, artists were bloating their records with filler and labels were increasing their profits, compounding consumer frustration. The Music Industry can claim ‘bellwether’ status all they want, but to miss the potential of the Internet was just ignorant, filing copyright infringement suits against your consumers was, and is, counterproductive, developing DRM technology was wasteful and futile, and to think consumers wouldn’t gravitate back to single consumption if given the opportunity is just evidence that a few key people had their head stuck in the sand. It was a nice effort, but it was all ‘reactive’. Nothing was proactive. Nobody thought to look ahead. Nobody thought to plan ahead, and for that, let’s take a moment and pause for the 7 Ps:
Prior Proper Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance
So…In order to leave you with something other than complaints about the obvious, here are a few things I’ve come up with that I would have done differently:
- Embrace and build P2P in an effort to monetize, cross-market, gather consumer data, and track consumer behavior
- Demand variable track pricing from day 1 in order to generate revenue with regard to demand
- Raise the ‘Standard’ track price
- Build Label-Owned and Label-Merchandised online music destination equipped to compete
- Empower a 3rd party vendor where competing labels have an equity stake
- Bring Booking, Publishing, and Management, Distribution, and Merch In-House where possible
- Develop a modular and streamlined way of delivering digital product
- Monetize every Artist website and begin a relationship with the consumer at a transactional level
- Abandon all DRM efforts
- Invest heavily in a more positive, artist-driven, public re-education campaign around Intellectual Property and Fair Use
- Aggressively restructure and reorganize
- Simplify physical product pricing, promotion, and distribution
You may agree or disagree with many of these, but I encourage you to leave your own ideas in the comments section, especially if you believe I’ve left a gaping hole somewhere. Not to necessarily ‘blamestorm’, but to better understand where we came from and what we have come through in order to better prepare ourselves for the future. Also, if you want to a consistently good read from a guy who really appreciates the history of the Music Business and music in general, subscribe to the Clore Chronicles.
Moving on though, I think the real challenge is where we go from here. Leoni-Sceti’s comments above regarding digital consumption versus revenue is a huge disconnect and a code that isn’t easily cracked. It makes it even more difficult to dig out given the macroeconomic constraints present in today’s US economy. From my perspective, I still don’t think we are proactive enough. I still don’t think we are aggressive enough. So many people are just clinging to their jobs and trying to manage their daily duties, previously handled by multiple people. I’m not sure who’s looking ahead anymore. Godin and Anderson are two of my favorite idea guys, but they aren’t the decision makers here. To make matters worse, I don’t think the future of the business is going to be as glaringly obvious as before. In the last year, we’ve watched Myspace rise and fall, Facebook gravitate towards women over 55, and Twitter rise to the top overnight in a manner that screams ‘fad’. We don’t have time for a slow build formula, technology, model, or destination, but that’s what instills trust, relationships, and ultimately transactions.
To sum it up:
The Music Industry can’t afford people spending time looking ahead, but then again…they can’t afford not too
Music: Its Very Own Loss Leader
June 23, 2009 at 1:07 am | In Marketing, Music Business | Leave a CommentTags: Album, CD, deep discount, digital, EP, Free Download, Loss Leader, Media, merch, Music, p2p, tickets, Wal-mart
Consumers want songs. There are exceptions when it comes to artists like Pink Floyd, but the main reason that consumers bought albums for years is because they had to. It was the only way to get the song they wanted and there were no easy technological workarounds. The music industry is fooling itself if it thinks the consumer will ever go back to buying albums or that bundling records up as digital Album Only purchases will actually help.
Pandora’s box has been opened.
It was essentially a race to zero. The labels began streaming early on. They could get around publishing fees that way and still expose their artists. Then there was the “Free Download”, as if that was going to curb the appetite for P2P use. After the free download, it was the free EP because intuition, or insecurity rather, said that “One song just wasn’t enough,” and now we have successfully moved to giving away the full album. From Radiohead to Nine Inch Nails, to Coldplay, and beyond. These high profile stunts have trained consumers to expect free or at least deep discounted products and to bypass anything at full price. Each of these stunts were loss leaders for tickets, merch, or future premium products which directly benefited those artists. The problem is that most labels don’t benefit from tickets, merch, or in some cases premium products. They only own the content so treating it like a loss leader is counterproductive.
When you go to Wal-mart to grab a deep discounted CD (or loss leader), Wal-mart is banking on you buying a plunger and a toothbrush before you leave. When you buy an album at a deep discount, the label hopes that you will tell your friends so they go buy it, pack mom’s minivan with friends headed to the show where you all come home wearing the t-shirt.
The reality is that you won’t tell your friends, you’ll just burn them a copy, and the label won’t make a dime off of the ticket sales or merch. The reality is that you can’t be your own loss leader. It’s either time for the labels to successfully invest in plungers and toothbrushes (figuratively speaking), or time for management and booking agencies to begin participating in recording costs. In the meantime, the labels need to be doing everything they can to stop devaluing their lifeline – recorded music.
The Long Tail in Question
May 25, 2009 at 5:00 am | In Marketing, Music Business | 1 CommentTags: Amazon, audio, Catalog, CDBaby, Chris Anderson, consumers, Content, Demand, digital, Digital Media Digest, distribution, Economics, Harvard, internet, iTunes, label, long tail, Music, Online, Project Studio, Record Labels, Supply, The Long Tail, Tunecore
Chris Anderson’s Long Tail Theory is under scrutiny, and both sides have reason to claim victory. I’d be interested in Chris running his numbers again with data from iTunes and AmazonMP3. If I had to guess, his 98% rule is overstated at best. Keep in mind he was doing his research on data from 2004, which is way too early to develop a trend rule that will stand the test of time. Regardless, after analyzing the data that I do have access to, I fully believe in the value of the “tail”, but I’ve come up with a series of x-factors that I believe were underestimated, ultimately leading to a 98% rule in question, and Long Tail under the microscope.
- Project Studio Proliferation in the 90s:
- Creative and Financial filters were destroyed.
- Music creation became affordable…not just consumption.
- Supply increased exponentially.
- Digital Content Delivery Services:
- The Internet:
- Destroyed traditional distribution filters
- Introduced a retail environment absent of scarcity.
- Distribution products without demand became possible.
- Consumers given access to their niche
- The Majors realize value in Digital Distribution:
- Released a flood of product with little or diminishing demand into the market. For example, out-of-print titles could be resurrected without the traditional costs of manufacturing, stocking, and distribution.
- Streamline processes to make extend their “tail”.
I believe we will hit what I call a “Ground Zero” with audio content by 2010. The Majors will have completed their catalog delivery and any pent up product still looking for distribution will have found it’s way into the digital marketplace. By then, who knows what new technologies will be available or what challenges lie ahead. I appreciate Anderson’s work in trendspotting and hope, for the sake of us all working in the industry, he will continue to keep his theory fluid, updated, and transparent.
TurnItUpMedia: Ad-Model with a Purpose
April 19, 2009 at 2:39 am | In Marketing, Music Business | Leave a CommentTags: Ad, Advertisement, Catalog, Credit, Digital Music, DSP, It, Media, model, Music, Turn, TurnItUpMedia, Up
I could play the cynic and tell you there’s yet another digital music retailer out there that won’t make it. I could tell you that because it’s an ad-based model it’s doomed from the start. I could tell you that consumers have found a home at iTunes and Amazon, but the truth is that we never really know what is or isn’t going to work. TurnItUpMedia.com has a new twist to the ad model and this is the time to test everything.
TurnItUpMedia has three things going for it.
- Targeted Advertising: You choose the ad you want to watch from a selection of ad screenshots. The selection of ads presented to the consumer is based on certain interests, preferences, and demographic information selected in the account registration process.
- Rewards: Each ad watched accumulates credits. Credits can be redeemed for music. Credits can also be purchased.
- Breadth of Catalog: All major label content available.
Give it a spin. Be sure to leave your feedback here.
iTunes – Sticker Shock & Basic Economics
April 17, 2009 at 4:45 pm | In Marketing, Music Business | Leave a CommentTags: 1.29, 69, 99, apple, April, Chart, Demand, Economics, iTunes, price, Pricing, scarcity, song, Sticker Shock, title, track, value, Variable, variable pricing
iTunes introduced variable pricing at the beginning of April. Early research is showing a decline in sales for titles bearing a $1.29 price point. This is absolutely no surprise for 2 reasons:
1) Sticker Shock: The iTunes customer is conditioned to a 99cent track price. $1.29 is a 30% increase. Most of us notice a 30% price hike on any product that we regularly purchase (gas, groceries, etc.) so it’s no surprise that the impulse buyer is going to prioritize their list of desired music and think twice before buying. The good news for the labels is that sticker shock wears off quickly and as soon as the price structure feels like the new standard, people will resume their impulse behavior.
2) Basic Economics: When you raise the price of a product, you reduce the demand. Conversely, you usually lower a price to stimulate demand. This is why even the top tracks are suffering on the charts right now. People consume based on their purchasing power and a higher price per track reduces the number of tracks a consumer can afford. The bad news is that the laws of economics are rarely broken, but a move to variable pricing is a healthy move. All tracks aren’t created equal, and although scarcity doesn’t exist in the world of digital music, value still determines demand. A top selling title has more value than a low selling title, therefore, it yeild a higher price. The consumer’s shouldn’t have to pay the same price for tracks of different value, and the labels or artists shouldn’t have to charge the same price for different products either.
If I had to guess, I’d say that sticker shock will be a moot point in a few months and there will be a more consistent list of higher and lower priced tracks by the fall. Once most of the top titles are $1.29 and most of the low titles are $0.69, the charting will look normal again.
Relationship Marketing: Bringing back “Direct to Consumer”
March 1, 2009 at 4:28 am | In Marketing, Mobile, Music Business | Leave a CommentTags: iTunes, Music Industry, Marketing, record label, customer, Walmart, consumer, D2C, Direct to Consumer, Sales, CD, Technology, Relationship, Word of Mouth, Trust, Communication, Product, partner, gadget, Early Adopter, partnership, Mobile, Cell Phone
I can’t prove it, but my guess is that “Direct to Consumer” was the earliest form of retail. An artisan crafted his product and then sold it directly to those in the community who were willing to pay for it. His brand was his reputation and his reputation was only as good as his product and his relationship with his customers. Marketing his product was exactly the same as marketing himself. Things have changed since then. Mass manufacturing and distribution have opened the doors for specialists, but specialists, by default, need partners, and partners, by default, come between the maker and the buyer, effectively destroying the essence of Direct to Consumer.
So there is a disconnect. One that marketers have tried to cover up for decades by telling stories and connecting the dots between products and consumers. It’s just that those messages are falling more frequently upon deaf ears, or at best competing against a hundred other messages at once.
There are also technological issues at play. Marketing is story-telling; stories require channels, and most channels are dictated by technology. So “gadgets” become the gatekeepers of the story. This was not a problem when the gadget was ubiquitous, but buyers are dispersing at an exponential rate into niche electronic ecosystems where standards are sparse and quality is demanded. The mobile industry is a perfect example of this. Even though almost everyone you know owns a mobile phone, each carrier is proprietary, each handset model is unique, and each user utilizes the phone’s features differently.
Abundant resources are still being spent on some tried and true methods of marketing (TV, Radio, Advertising, Email, Retail Placement, etc) but it’s becoming a crap-shoot at best. If you’re selling records, radio stations have to hit millions of people weekly to see any retail conversion at all, and the costs of advertising has becoming more difficult to justify with every click-thru campaign. We all know that email open rates are unacceptable and retail shelf space is shrinking. So this brings us back to the basics. Back to an entrepreneurial level. To make matters worse, while the industry straps up its boots, history laughs as we complain about going through this inevitable valley that some argue we created for ourselves. Especially in this economy, the Music Industry’s corporate structure is a great way to be cost effective, but the corporate mentality is a liability. So what is the most important asset moving forward? Relationships
What are 2 key elements of a successful relationship?
- Communication
- Trust
And what does a relationship get you?
- A Valid Email Address
- An Attentive Ear
- An Impulse Buy
- An Early Adopter
- An Open Wallet
- A Repeat Customer
- Word of Mouth (The loudest most effective Voice)
To the music industry’s credit, over the years they specialized in “music” while forging thousands of crucial and lucrative partnerships with 3rd parties (iTunes, Wal-Mart, Amazon, Best Buy, etc) to accelerate their product into the marketplace and amplify the message. For these partners, product was supplied, so their efforts were focused on building a strong relationship with their consumer. While there is nothing wrong with these partnerships, the labels failed to create their own direct relationship with their artists’ fans, ultimately bringing us to where we are now; completely reliant upon our partners to generate revenue for our products and communicate with our customers. Sure. We did a lot of good things to help promote the roster, but we didn’t do anything to take the relationship to the next level. We didn’t complete the cycle. We didn’t monetize it. Monetization requires a higher level of trust. A clearer method of communication. A level of trust and communication that turns a fan into a consumer. It’s a different challenge altogether. A challenge that is dependent upon deep relationships.
Maybe it wasn’t possible to facilitate this relationship then, or maybe it wasn’t cost effective. Regardless, our partners are not only taking our margin, they are taking our customer data and severing our communication lines in the process. Every credit card swiped at Wal-Mart or account setup at iTunes is another brick in the wall between the labels and music buyers. Sure, the product is moving and that’s great, but the spoils of the sale go to the partners, and the longer we wait, the more difficult it becomes to get that back.
So we begin with relationships. Deep relationships.
The Long Tail (A Second Look Pt. 1)
December 23, 2008 at 6:44 pm | In Marketing, Music Business | Leave a CommentTags: digital distribution, iTunes, long tail, rule, scale, scarcity, The Long Tail, theory
I read Anderson’s The Long Tail when it was first published and I have to admit my intrigue. I was new to the world of digital marketing and I was responsible for expanding the company’s digital revenue stream. Unfortunately that was a few years ago and though the theory has been a topic around the water cooler since then, I’m a little rusty on my Anderson quotes, so I am rereading it in an effort to re-examine the theory in detail and try to make some sense of the recent scrutiny it has undertaken. Here’s the first of many thoughts to come.
Scale (The 98% Rule)
On the surface, page 8 tells a compelling story about how 98% of a 10,000 track Digital Jukebox (i.e. TouchTunes) catalog sold at least one unit per quarter. The story is used to explain how digital distribution defies scarcity and when consumers are given options, they spread out more comfortably in their preferred niche of music consumption. The problem here is scale. 98% of 10K tracks is 9800 tracks. Apple released a press release in 2004, the same year Anderson was speaking to Robbie Vann-Adibe at Digital Jukebox, stating that iTunes had over 1 million songs available in their store for download. If Digital Jukebox were operating their business as anyone else would they would be prioritizing their ingestion process and their deal-making to secure the tracks with the most demand first. Even if Digital Jukebox was not prioritizing the content for distribution, it would have been prioritized for them by the labels as there are cost involved with digital product delivery. So let’s do the math.
10K Digital Jukebox Tracks / 1Million Digital Tracks in Market = 1% Digital Catalog 2004
In essence, it’s hard to conclude that Digital Jukebox proves anything about the long “Tail”, because they were most likely operating almost completely within the head (see pic).
Over the years, I have seen evidence of the Long Tail at work, so this blog is not to discount the theory, but it is important to understand that it’s only a theory. It’s no more accurate than the 80/20 rule, but it’s a great starting point for labels to realize potential revenue as the rules of distribution change and scarcity becomes extinct.
…Comments Welcome
Challenges facing Direct to Consumer Initiatives
December 17, 2008 at 1:43 am | In Marketing, Music Business | 1 CommentTags: D2C, Direct to Consumer, Liability, record label
The goal for every Direct to Consumer start-up should be creating a great customer experience. Even though Direct to Consumer is necessary and something the Majors should have broken ground on years ago, the consumer experience is the reason that it will never be the ultimate solution. It’s a great way to service a superfan with exclusive content, bundle products together, and energize the core, but if I’m a casual pop/rock consumer and I want to buy Coldplay, Britney Spears, All American Rejects, and let’s say Victor Wooten…because we all like to think we are eclectic…I’ve got to shop at 4 different stores to satisfy my thirst. Or I could go to Amazon.
The record labels have been tossing “Direct to Consumer” terminology around for decades. It’s this dream that one day, they will own the distribution and retail channel for their products. Digital formats and the vast capabilities of the Internet now fuel the fire burning at the end of this tunnel. Even though the light is more evident, the major labels are no closer to a good solution than they were a year ago and the patchwork quilt of makeshift solutions I’ve seen or read about lately are almost always utilizing 3rd party vendors in some way. This not only voids the D2C portion of the effort, but complicates the entire issue. The benefits of D2C are higher margins at point of sale, acquisition of customer data (or fan data), control of the product configuration (digital, physical, posters, t-shirts, tickets, etc.), merchandising control, customized and well-times marketing campaigns, and control of the price-point. Those benefits have to be weighed against these challenges in order to create a successful D2C solution.
- Rising Costs – With higher margins, come higher costs of doing business. You’ve got new expenses (i.e. Web Design, IS&T, Accounting, Customer Service, Online Marketing, Micropayment Transaction Fees, distribution, etc.)
- Trust – As each label creates their own storefront and online shopping cart, they are asking each consumer to trust yet another cyber-entity with their credit card information. Getting a consumer to register, login, and then purchase is a daunting task. One that even experienced retailers like Amazon have trouble doing on a tight budget.
- Standards – Within each genre, there are multiple labels. Great for healthy competition, but horrendous when you think that each label within each genre would be asking every consumer for their personal information on an individual level. Each site will be different, some easy to navigate and some a nightmare. Consumers want an easy solution and a transparent transaction. They want to feel like it’s not costing them anything.
- Liability - This goes back to trust. The more sites that pop up, the more difficult it becomes for the consumer to distinguish which ones can be trusted. The door is wide open for mock websites and other spamming opportunities. Risk increases significantly along with your payroll if you expect to keep the damages to a minimum.
Collaboration
December 17, 2008 at 12:21 am | In Images, Marketing | Leave a CommentTags: Collaboration, idea, Light Bulb

Collaboration
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